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The Optimal Commons
Barry C. Field
Much of the work on problems of open-access
and common-property natural resources has

been focused on deducing and documenting

the pathologies of inefficiency to which these
resources are prone. Another important job
has been deriving policy conclusions; the main
one being, perhaps, that productivity will improve in proportion to the speed with which a

change is made to individual, or something
that behaves like individual, ownership. In

between then and now a switch occurred from

a system dependent on large amounts of common property to one based exclusively on individual private property. There is interest in
knowing when this change occurred; we might
like to examine, among other things, the economic forces that led to the change. But if we
search through the documents to find the year
when the change was made from common to
individual in any of the seventeenth and eighteenth century agricultural communities of
New England, we would not find it. Instead we
would find a transition period during which

making these prescriptions our kit bag of institutional forms contains depressingly few
items; in fact, it contains just two: common
time the land ownership pattern gradually
and individual. We have a situation analogous
changed. In some towns the transition was
to one we had in the 1950s, when all goods
were divided into two types: private and pub- rather rapid, perhaps 60-80 years. In other
lic. But the space between these two goods towns it was slower, taking well over a centypes was soon filled in with an infinity of tury. And in Sandwich, Massachusetts, the
intermediate forms. It is only fair that we fill complete transition took something like 250
up the comparable space in the property in- years. In the rest of the paper I want to sketch
stitutions continuum.
out one possible approach to modeling this
phenomenon.
When the first English settlers came to New
England in the seventeenth century, they
The process of transition consisted of dividchose to farm much of their land in common.
ing the total land resource into smaller and
smaller commons. Assume there are N farmBesides the individually enclosed home lots,

these communities at first had common planters in a particular community. At one extreme
ing fields, common meadows for harvesting
they may all work the total land resource in
hay, and common pastures.' Historians differ
common; at the other extreme they may deson why this was so; some take a cultural-capiignate N separate plots, with each farmer cultal view that common land use was an institutivating a plot individually. But there are many
tional holdover from the settlers' land of oriintermediate positions. Let m be the number
gin. Others lean toward the position that of tracts identified in the community, each to
common land represented an institutional re-be worked by one or more farmers. Ruling out

sponse to the conditions faced by the new any reduction in N, then 1 - m ? N. Any

settlers. We need not settle this issue here; particular value of m between 1 and N gives a
whatever the correct explanation for this his-mixture of common and individual property;
torical fact, it is certainly true that commoneach tract is owned privately by a subset of the
land use is today totally absent from commer-N farmers but used by them in common.2
cial agriculture in New England.
Assume that land institutions currently in
From these facts we fearlessly deduce that use involve a particular value for m; an increase or decrease in this parameter has three
Barry C. Field is an associate professor in the Department of
primary impacts on costs and outputs:
Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Massachu(a) A change in resources devoted to desetts.
Paper No. 2691 of the Massachusetts Agricultural Experiment
fining and enforcing private rights. This inStation. This research was supported in part from Experiment
Station Project No. 577.
The author thanks Tom Stevens for many helpful comments.
2 Among the Navajos the fenced-in range areas within which
I These common planting fields are enclosed by a single
fence
several
permit holders graze their sheep is a clear example of an
but there are individual tracts within the fence.
intermediate sized commons. See Libecap and Johnson, p. 82.
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cludes such things
fencing
l
Y =as
m[F(x,
r) - xw - T(x, n)] costs,
- E(m).
to determine title, costs of detecting
The T function is obviously a great simping encroachments, and so on. Call these

exclusion costs.

plification of a complex process. Individual

reductions in use of a commons are in the
(b) Changes in the total value of commonnature of public goods, they confer benefit on
property externalities in the community. How
every firm using the commons, not just to the
much change occurs as a result of smaller
firm making the reduction. Individual firms are
numbers of firms using each commons is uncertain. In some models of common property,better off to the extent that they can free ride
such as that of Dasgupta and Heal, the extenton the reductions of other firms. Free riding
could also be expected with respect to sharing
to which the commons is used in excess of the
rent-maximizing level depends on the numberthe costs of the political skills and enforcement resources required to achieve agreement
of users who are allowed access to the reon reductions in x. For present purposes we
source; the smaller this number the less the
overuse, even with no controls on use by indi- assume these processes are solved, much as
vidual members of the group. Thus, the larger early club theory assumed away the problem
of collecting contributions to the provision of
number of commons areas into which the total
the
public good.
land area is divided, the lower the overuse in
each area and therefore the lower the aggre- Shifts in T function would come about
gate overuse. As m approaches N, the overusethrough changes in the technology of group
approaches zero. In the recent work of Comesdecision making. A reduction in the strength
and Sandler, however, full rent dissipation oc-of complementary social institutions (e.g., the
church in colonial times) might be expected to
curs as long as n > 1.
(c) Changes in transactions costs of reach- shift T upwards. A change from unanimity to
ing x-limiting agreements among users of a majority rules would shift it down. Increases
commons. A major factor affecting these costsin the heterogeneity of the users of the comis simply the number of firms using a com- mons could be expected to shift T upwards,
mons; thus, as this number declines it should since agreement would become harder to atbe less costly to reach agreements to limit thetain.
The exclusion cost function, E(m), shows
quantity of variable input applied to the resource.
how total exclusion costs vary with the number of commons. In simplest terms these might
It is the balance between common-property
be fencing
costs, which would increase as the
externalities, transactions costs,
and exclutotal
land
area
was split into more commons.
sion costs that determines the optimal comExclusion costs, in the case of common remons. Define the following terms:
source use, are subject to a strong public-goods
N is the total number of farmers in the
type problem. The benefits of excluding others
community;
from a resource apply equally to all those who
m, the number of commons;
continue to have access. Thus much of the
n(= N/m), the number of farmers per
cost of excluding firms may be resources recommons;
quired
to deal with free riders.
ri, the amount of land used by farmers
in the

ith common;

There are essentially two variables to ad-

xi, the amount of variable input used in thejust, finding the optimal number of commons
m and then determining the optimal x, or inith common;
F(x,r), total output in the ith common; Fx 5 tensity of use in each eqmmons. We take these
0, Fxx < 0, Fr > 0, Frr < 0; F is assumed to up in reverse order. Given m, both n and r are
fixed, so the condition for optimal x is
display constant returns;

p,w, prices of output and the variable input,
(1) pF, - w - T, = 0
respectively;
T(x,n), transactions costs of reaching agree- Since T, < 0, each commons is used at a

ment on levels of xi, T, < 0, T, > 0; and
E(m), total exclusion costs, Em > 0.

point where pFx < w. Figure 1 depicts this

solution: F*", shows returns in terms of reve-

Assuming that all farmers are identical, the nues minus variable cost for a given size of
total land area will be divided into m comcommons, i.e., given r and n; T1 shows the
mons, each of the same size with the same
transactions costs of achieving reductions in x;
number of farmers. Under these circumT1 has been set at zero at the open-access, or
stances, total agricultural rent is
zero-return, level ofx. It could originate to the
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and an/am are negative, while Fr and T, are
positive. In figure 1, an increase, say, in the
number of commons would shift F* to F*2 and

$1

F*

F*,. Transactions costs would change to T2

1

T

T2

giving a new optimal usage at x2. It is possible
for the impacts on productivity and transactions costs of changing the number of commons to cancel each other out, leaving rent per
common unchanged. In this case total rent

would change by virtue of a change in the

X2 x1 x' x

number of commons.

The condition for the optimal size of m can
Figure 1. Optimal use rate for a commons
be depicted graphically. In figure 2, the Z function is the left side of expression (2); it consists
left of this if it were the case that some reduc-

of marginal income gains net of marginal

tion in x would occur automatically as a result,
transactions costs. Z1 is an initial situation,
for example, of particular strategies adopted
showing little income difference between few
by the commoners.
and many commons; Z2, on the other hand,
The optimal level of x is determined
bya the
refers to
later time when, because, say, of
tangencies of T and F*, implyingrising
that heterogeneity
the examong farmers or a detent to which a resource is overused,is a funccline in the strength of complementary social
tion of decision costs. If no effort were made
institutions, a system of smaller commons is
by the commoners to limit their capable
use, x'
ofwould
producing much larger net rents
be the quantity of variable inputthan
applied.
one of But
larger commons. The E functions
at x' there are returns to be had from making
show how marginal aggregate exclusion costs
and enforcing x-limiting agreements.
change with the number of commons; E1 is the
The optimal number of commons
can be and E2 refers to a new situainitial condition

found with

dY
dm

tion in which because, say, of technological

= [F(x, r) - xw - T (x, n)]

change in fence construction or the development of a more efficient technique for detect-

ing trespassers, marginal exclusion costs do

+ m ax(F - Tx- w)
Lam

ar an

+ -;am
Fr Tn
] Em
am
I = O, or

not rise as fast with an increase in the number

of commons as was initially the case. As
drawn, the optimal commons moves from mi

to m2 between these two periods. How fast

and far the optimal commons changes through

time is apparently
a function of the shapes of E
(2) F(x, r) - xw - T(x,
n)

and Z, as well as the speed with which they

shift.

+ mFr ar an Tn) = Em.
There/
is no doubt that other approaches
mr am am

could be taken to finding the optimal degree of
The left side of this last expression is the
gain in total rent from a change in the number
of commons, while the right side is the change
in total exclusion cost resulting from that
change. The first three terms on the left side
are the total rent earned on the representative
MiM
common, while the last term is the change in
z2
rent on a representative common when the
number of commons is changed. The forces
tending to change the rent per common are a
change in the amount of resource utilized by
the common (ar/am) and its associated impact
on output (Fr), together with the change in
1 m1 m2 N m
number of firms (an/am) with the resulting
impact on transaction costs (T,). Both ar/am Figure 2. Optimal nu
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